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This paper investigates whether or not the adoption of the Euro has facilitated the introduction of structural
reforms, defined as deregulation in the product markets and liberalization and deregulation in the labor
markets. After reviewing the theoretical arguments that may link the adoption of the Euro and structural
reforms, we investigate the empirical evidence. We find that the adoption of the Euro has been associated
with an acceleration of the pace of structural reforms in the product market. The adoption of the Euro
does not seem to have accelerated labor market reforms in the "primary labor market;" however, the
run up to the Euro adoption seems to have been accompanied by wage moderation. We also investigate

























This paper investigates whether or not the adoption of the Euro has
facilitated the introduction of structural reforms, de￿ned as deregulation
in the product markets and liberalization and deregulation in the labor
markets. After reviewing the theoretical arguments that may link the
adoption of the Euro and structural reforms, we investigate the empirical
evidence. We ￿nd that the adoption of the Euro has been associated with
an acceleration of the pace of structural reforms in the product market.
The adoption of the Euro does not seem to have accelerated labor market
reforms in the "primary labor market;" however, the run up to the Euro
adoption seems to have been accompanied by wage moderation. We also
investigate issues concerning the sequencing of goods and labor market
reforms.
Keywords: Euro, structural reforms, deregulation, European labor
markets.
1 Introduction
One of the arguments in favor of the introduction of the common currency area
in Europe was that it would have pressured member countries to improve their
macroeconomic policy and pursue ￿structural reforms,￿the latter being de￿ned
as labor and product markets￿liberalization and deregulation. Has it worked?
Have members of the Euro area had a better policy performance after adopting
the common currency?
High in￿ ation countries have gained a sound monetary policy with the adop-
tion of the common currency and the European Central Bank. The Euro does
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1not have any direct implication for ﬁscal policy1, but its adoption was accom-
panied ﬁrst by the imposition of converge criteria on budget deﬁcits and public
debt and then by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which established some
rules about deﬁcits. For some high-debt countries (e.g., Italy, Belgium, and
Greece), the threat of being left out served as an incentive to initiate ﬁscal
adjustments. However, once the Euro was introduced, the threat of exclusion
vanished2, large deﬁcits reappeared in several member countries, and the SGP
was widely violated: another chapter in this volume, by Fatas and Mihov, dis-
cusses ﬁscal policy in the Euro area. In this chapter, we focus on structural
reforms.
Why should joining the common monetary area accelerate and facilitate
structural reforms? We can think of a few sound economic arguments and some
wishful thinking. On the former (and more solid) ground, more competition due
to the single market might increase the cost of regulation in the product markets.
The protection of insider ﬁrms and workers would become more costly and more
visible to consumers and voters. For example, imagine a country that protects a
national airline at the expense of a low-cost one that ﬂies in the rest of the Union:
the costs for the travellers and taxpayers would be large and obvious. This would
also weaken the insiders of the protected national airline, from union workers
to pilots to managers accumulating losses at the expenses of taxpayers. Of
course, this argument presupposes that the Euro per se is a necessary condition
for having a truly common market, a point which requires discussion. Second,
the elimination of strategic devaluations shuts down a (possibly temporary)
adjustment channel for a country losing competitiveness. In the product market,
this means that ﬁrms and their organizations may demand deregulation of the
market for inputs such as non-tradable services, energy, and transportation
to contain costs. Also, if real wage growth is out of line with productivity, a
nominal devaluation is not available any more as a solution (or a palliative). This
creates incentives for countries to free their labor markets from regulations that
create obstacles for real wage adjustments and labor mobility and ﬂexibility. In
fact, those who were skeptical about the introduction of the Euro (see Obstfeld
1997, for instance) raised precisely the issue of real wage adjustment and labor
market rigidities: the elimination of those was seen as a condition diﬃcult to
implement but necessary for the Euro to survive. It is interesting to note that
the pre-Euro economic debate focused much more on labor market reforms and
much less, or not at all, on product markets, while in reality, as we will see
below, the latter markets were liberalized ﬁrst.
The wishful thinking part was the rhetoric often too common in Europe
according to which any step towards integration is “by deﬁnition” good and
brings about all sort of wonderful achievements for the Continent. More se-
riously, many commentators viewed the adoption of the Euro as essentially a
political move, a step towards some sort of United States of Europe. Jacques
1One possible indirect channel is through an interest rate eﬀect caused by very large public
debt of some (large) countries, but this eﬀect is likely to be small.
2See the chapter by Barry Eichengreen in this volume on the low probability of a collapse
of the Euro system.
2Delors is quoted as saying, "Obsession about budgetary constraints means that
the people forget too often about the political objectives of the European con-
stitution. The argument in favor of the single currency should be based on the
desire to live together in peace."3
When we started this research project, we were rather skeptical that we
would ﬁnd any eﬀect of the Euro on structural reforms. English-speaking coun-
tries like the US, New Zealand, the UK, and Ireland had started major dereg-
ulation processes way before the birth of the Euro, some Nordic countries (in
and out of the Euro area) had followed more recently as a result of poor eco-
nomic performance in the nineties, and some laggards like Greece, Belgium,
Italy, France and Germany were struggling to keep the pace. The Euro did not
seem to have much to do with this timing. Much to our surprise, the empir-
ical results were diﬀerent. We uncovered signiﬁcant correlations between the
speed of adoption of structural reforms in the goods market and the adoption
of the Euro. With respect to labor markets, the picture is more nuanced and
complex. We ﬁnd no evidence that the adoption of the Euro has accelerated
labor market reforms in the "primary" market. This result does not imply that
NO labor market reforms have occurred in Europe, but rather means that the
adoption of the Euro has not accelerated reforms. However, in several countries
in Europe, we now have a "secondary" market of labor with temporary and
much more ﬂexible contracts. We still do not have good data on a comparable
international basis to examine the evolution of the markets. Indirectly, how-
ever, one could look at whether nominal wages have reacted more or less to past
inﬂation and whether there has been wage moderation and, therefore, a smaller
"second round" inﬂationary eﬀect. We ﬁnd that, in countries preparing to enter
the Euro during the period from 1993 to 1998, there have indeed been signs of
substantial wage moderation and a slowing down of the adjustment of nominal
wages to past inﬂation. This is likely to have been part of the macroeconomic
eﬀorts to meet the criteria to enter the monetary union. After the adoption of
the Euro, wage moderation seems to have lost some steam, perhaps as a result
of "fatigue." However, in certain countries such as Germany, wage moderation
continued until recently. In others, like Italy and France, the evidence is mixed.
We also investigated the sequencing of goods and labor market reforms.
The former have generally come sooner than the latter. This important issue
has been raised by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and empirically investigated
by Fiori, Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Schiantarelli (2007). Our results show that
deregulation of labor markets is made easier by product market deregulation.
However, there are features of the labor market which seem to be a useful
precondition for product market deregulation: namely, the reduction of ﬁring
costs and, even more, the existence of unemployment beneﬁts. This makes
sense, since deregulation of product markets implies labor reallocations across
ﬁrms and sectors, which require some labor market ﬂexibility, any may lead, at
least in the short run, to higher unemployment.
3See Eichengreen, this volume, for the original citation. See Alesina and Perotti (2004) for
a criticism of EU rhetoric.
3We should be clear from the start that we are considering a handful of
countries: eleven original members of the Euro area (all but Luxemburg), a few
EU but not Euro members and the remaining OECD countries. We are also
looking at a one-shot event: the introduction of the Euro. It is possible that a
certain timing of reforms across countries may lead to a spurious correlation that
happens to coincide with the adoption of the Euro.4 Or it may be possible that it
is not the Euro per se but the membership in the European Union that creates
incentives for product market deregulation and there are simply not enough
countries that are members of the EU but not members of the monetary union
to identify this diﬀerence.
Finally, the decision to adopt the Euro is clearly not exogenous, and we
try to address issues of endogeneity. The recent literature on currency areas
(Alesina and Barro (2002), Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002)) oﬀers insight
about instruments that may have led to the decision of adoption. One should,
however, be aware that various countries adopted the Euro for diﬀerent reasons.
In some cases, it was done mostly for anchoring purposes (e.g., in Italy), while
in other cases, the intention was to be at the core of the European integration
process (e.g., in France and Germany). In fact, one theme of the pre-Euro debate
amongst economists was "What is the beneﬁt for Germany?". There seemed to
be no big economic gains for this country, which seemed to provide the service
of being an anti-inﬂation anchor without receiving an obvious beneﬁti nr e t u r n .
However, the beneﬁt was political. To put it diﬀerently, the decision was partly
dictated by non-economic factors hard to capture with an instrument.
We are not the ﬁrst to investigate the relationship between the adoption of
the Euro and structural reforms. IMF (2004) suggests that belonging to the
EU accelerates the reform process in the product market but has no conclusive
eﬀect on the labor market. Yet this paper fails to disentangle the eﬀects of the
adoption of the Euro and of the ESM. Hoj et al. (2006) provide supporting
evidence to these results. They ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of the European Single
Market (ESM) on product market reforms — particularly in the transportation
and telecommunication sectors — but no impact on the labor market. However,
they do not directly test for the eﬀects of the Euro. Duval and Elmeskov (2005)
instead investigate this issue using a database of OECD countries, in which they
analyze large structural reforms in the labor and product market. Stacking to-
gether these (diﬀerent) reform measures, they conclude that a lack of monetary
autonomy, which is deﬁned as belonging to the EMU or to other ﬁxed exchange
rate regimes,5 can have a negative, signiﬁcant impact of the probability of un-
dertaking large structural reforms, but only in large economies. In a database
of 178 countries on a longer, yet less recent, time span (1970-2000), Belke et
4F o ri n s t a n c es o m ed i r e c t i v eo ft h eE u r o p e a nC o m m i s s i o nr e g a r d i n gs o m es e c t o r sd e c i d e d
in the mid nineties implied actions to be taken in 1998 and 2000 for all members of the
European Union. This timing coincide with the adoption of the Euro. Note, however, that
these directives do not apply only to EMU countries but to all the EU countries. Nevertheless
this timing may imply some spurious correlation.
5For instance, Austria is classiﬁed under a de facto ﬁxed exchange regime with the Deutsche
Mark, even before the EMU.
4al. (2005) obtain diﬀerent results. They ﬁnd that a higher degree of monetary
authority independence, as measured by an index of exchange rate ﬂexibility,
has a positive impact on an overall index of reform eﬀort, especially in the ﬁnan-
cial and banking sectors. They ﬁnd no robust evidence for an index of market
regulation in the sample of OECD countries.
This chapter is organized as follows: In section 2, we discuss the rationale for
which the Euro might favor structural reforms. Section 3 presents our results
on product market deregulation. Section 4 discusses results on labor market
reforms, while the last section contains the conclusion.
2 Structural reforms and the Euro
2.1 Why should the Euro matter?
The adoption of the Euro and the implementation of structural reforms in the
labor and product markets seem, at ﬁrst glance, to be two largely unrelated
events. However, the Euro has always been portrayed as the ﬁnal stage of a
process of economic integration among the country members of the European
Union that involved more trade, more labor and capital mobility: in a word,
fewer restrictions on the mobility of goods, services and people. To achieve
this goal, the introduction of the European Single Market (the ESM) in 1992
established a legal framework to increase trade and competition in the EU and
allowed the European Commission to rule against state aid or against monop-
olistic practices to all EU members. Thus, it seems quite plausible that the
ESM would have had an eﬀect on product and labor market reform. But the
subsequent adoption of the Euro did not have direct legal eﬀects on competition
policies. Did it have economic implications on it?
Several commentators have discussed various reasons why the adoption of
the Euro may facilitate or, on the contrary, create obstacles to the adoption of
structural reforms.
On the pro-reform side, one may argue that entrance into the EMU acts as an
external constraint that pushes countries to reform. By relinquishing the control
of the monetary policy to an external authority (the ECB), member countries
become unable to use their monetary policy to accommodate negative shocks.
This might have created incentives to liberalize the labor and product market in
order to rely more heavily on market-based adjustments that take place through
changes in prices and wages (Bean, 1998 and Duval and Elmeskov, 2005).
A single currency may also increase price transparency and therefore facili-
tate trade. A larger European market increases competition and makes it more
diﬃcult for domestic monopolists to protect their rents. It is certainly true that
Europe does not have a truly common market in every sector, especially in the
service sector, where domestic protection, direct or indirect, is still widespread.
Yet, the degree of competition and integration in the European product mar-
k e th a sl a r g e l yi n c r e a s e di nt h el a s tt w od e c a d e s . T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tal a r g e r
common market makes it more diﬃcult for local monopolists to dominate local
5markets, this might have created pressures to deregulate product markets. Yet,
is this the result of the Euro increasing the trading opportunities across member
countries, or is it simply the impact of the ESM? In the empirical analysis, we
try to disentangle these two eﬀects.
The question of whether a monetary union is necessary for a common market
and whether it reduces trade barriers across countries and facilitates commerce
in goods, services and ﬁnancial assets has recently received much attention fol-
lowing a provocative paper by Rose (2000). This paper found that monetary
unions have an extremely large eﬀect on trade amongst members. Critics argued
(amongst other things) that most monetary unions in Rose’s sample involved
very small countries and that the eﬀects would have been much smaller in the
Euro area, an issue which the chapter by Frankel and Stein in this volume tack-
les.6 According to their chapter, the adoption of the Euro appears to have
facilitated trade among member countries, even though the order of magnitude
of this eﬀect is on a diﬀerent scale relative to Rose (2000) and seems more
realistic. Research applied to Canada and the US showed that trade between
Canadian provinces, even ones that were thousand of miles apart, was easier
than trade between US states and bordering Canadian provinces, suggesting
that a single currency matters for trade.7
Note that these pro-reform arguments based on the role of trade imply that
most action should take place in the tradable sector, where competition becomes
stronger, rather than in the non-tradable service sector. But ﬁrms in the trad-
able sector may react to an increase in competition by translating this pressure
upstream onto the intermediate goods producers — and hence only on the service
sector — and onto the labor market (see Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005).
The economic literature also provides some arguments suggesting that the
Euro may hinder structural reforms. Saint-Paul and Bentolila (2000b) argue
that, under the EMS, the up-front cost of structural reforms may increase.
Some labor market reforms may have positive long-term eﬀects but entail a
negative short-term impact in terms of higher unemployment. For this reason,
several commentators have favored a two-handed approach: structural reform
on the supply side, accompanied by expansionary aggregate demand policies.
Under the Euro, this two-handed policy may be more diﬃcult because aggregate
demand is more constrained at the national level and monetary policy is in the
hands of the ECB. A similar argument may apply to pension reforms. They
may provide long-term savings for the social security funds but may also imply
short-term budget deﬁcits, which may violate the limits imposed by the Growth
and Stability Pact.
Obstfeld (1997), in his early and wide-ranging review of the pros and cons of
the Euro, emphasized that the Euro would eliminate a major channel of adjust-
ment to macroeconomic shocks, namely a nominal devaluation of the exchange
rate, to regain competitiveness by reducing real wages for given (rigid) nominal
6Alesina and Barro (2002), Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002), Persson (2001), Thom
and Welsh (2002), and Tenreyro (2007) address theoretically and empirically a host of issues
relating the eﬀect of monetary unions on trade.
7See, for instance, McCallum (1995).
6wages. He suggested that this might put pressure on the unions to be more
ﬂexible about allowing adjustments to nominal and real wages and argued that
this was a necessary condition for the Euro to survive. The pessimists argued
that unions would not be so ﬂexible in Europe and that, on the contrary, they
would fuel political momentum against the Euro project, leading to its collapse.
Reality turned out to be more creative than economists’ predictions. There
have certainly been complaints and political rumblings against the Euro, mainly
in countries which felt they were especially in need of devaluation, as the chapter
by Barry Eichengreen in this volume documents, but the Euro has not collapsed
and does not seem even close to doing so. Sure enough, the political “battle”
with the unions for labor market reforms in many countries is still in place, and
the next few years may be critical.
Since, in many European countries, the labor unions have eﬀectively become
unions of old workers, public employees and pensioners (in Italy, for instance,
the majority of union members are retired), it should not come as a surprise that
they tolerated or even endorsed the introduction of temporary job contracts in
which young, entry-level workers would be hired without much or any protection
at low wages and could be ﬁred at will by the employers. In exchange, they kept a
very high degree of protection for older workers in the traditional labor markets.
Spain, Italy and France are prime examples.8 In Italy, around a third of the
newly created jobs are temporary contracts, and in Spain, the percentage reaches
50%. In the short run, this has worked in terms of increasing employment. In the
last ten years in Europe, about 18 million jobs have been created, just as many
as in the US. But in the medium run, lacking further reforms, this situation
may become explosive, because such a two-tier market might be unsustainable.
One may argue that, as these temporary workers became a large minor-
ity of the workforce, they will put pressure on the workers in the traditional
sector to abandon some of their privileges, creating a momentum in favor of
deregulation of the entire labor market.9 However, there is another possibility.
These temporary workers may demand to enter the traditional labor market
with all its implied protection and rules against ﬁring. If all these workers are
simply shifted into the traditionally rigid labor market of union-protected el-
derly workers, Europe will move back ten years. In summary, labor markets
in several European countries are then in a precarious position: half-baked re-
forms have created a two-tier labor market that is economically ineﬃcient and
politically unsustainable.
Finally, this discussion relates to issues of sequencing of reform, i.e., is it
more politically feasible to move ﬁrst with product market deregulation or labor
market deregulation? Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) argued that European
countries should ﬁrst deregulate the product market, claiming this would make
labor market reforms easier. The reasoning is that product market regulation
creates rents which are enjoyed both by incumbent ﬁrms and by labor unions.
8See St-Paul (1996) (2000a) for an early discussion of reforms that avoid touching the
interests on incumbents workers and focus only on new entrants and also for a comparison of
French and Spanish early reform attempts
9See St-Paul (1999) for a formalization of this argument.
7Unions would strenuously oppose labor market reforms that reduce their rents.
Product market reforms would curtail rents, reducing the beneﬁts for the unions
from the status quo in the labor market and thus reducing their opposition to
labor market reforms.
The argument is compelling, and as we will see below, European countries
have indeed moved faster on product market liberalizations than on labor market
ones. There is, however, one important caveat. Deregulation of product markets
sometimes implies closures or reductions in size of incumbent ﬁrms in favor of
new entrants and, more generally, reallocation of labor force from ﬁrm to ﬁrm
and sector to sector. This process of “creative destruction” generates temporary
unemployment. In countries in which ﬁring is costly, if not virtually impossible,
t h i sp r o c e s si sd i ﬃcult. In this respect, the elimination or reduction of ﬁring
costs is then a prerequisite for product market liberalization to work. The
elimination of ﬁring costs requires some well-designed system of unemployment
compensation, but not all European countries have this, a case in point being
Italy. Ineﬃciencies in the system of unemployment compensation give the unions
ammunition to defend existing jobs and oppose restructuring. So in this respect,
a labor market reform that reduces ﬁring costs and introduces unemployment
compensation systems seems like a prerequisite for a well-functioning product
marker deregulation. Denmark is an example of a country in which labor market
reforms have moved exactly in this direction.10
2.2 When do reforms occur?
In addition to the adoption of the Euro, other factors may create incentives
for governments to adopt structural reforms. On the one hand, one needs to
take such factors into account as controls, and they are interesting in their
own right. One commonly held view is that governments reform when they
are in a crisis and they have their backs against the wall. For the case of
ﬁscal reforms, one can easily identify a “crisis” as a runaway deﬁcit, and in
fact, Alesina, Ardagna and Trebbi (2006) show evidence consistent with this
hypothesis. Using a large sample of OECD and developing countries, they show
that ﬁscal adjustments and stabilization of inﬂation are more likely to occur
when this kind of macroeconomic imbalance degenerates into a crisis of runaway
(hyper) inﬂation or of very high budget deﬁcits.11 T h ec a s eo fs t r u c t u r a lr e f o r m s
is more complicated. Lack of reforms may lead to a slow decline which does not
degenerate into a sudden crisis. However, when the decline, evaluated in terms
of prolonged periods of low growth, begins to become “front page news,” then
reform blockers may lose some of their political clout. Recent discussions of
relative decline in Europe (and particularly of Italy) may be leading in that
10See for instance Alesina and Giavazzi (2006) for some discussion of the Danish case and
the applicability to other European countries.
11See Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Drazen and Grilli (1993) for models consistent with
this hypothesis and Drazen and Easterly (2001) for empirical evidence. See also Drazen (2000)
for an extensive discussion of the political economy of stabilization policies.
8direction.12 However, the recent ﬁnancial crisis may have generated a political
movement in some countries against deregulation and in favor of a return to
easy and long-term state intervention. At the time of this writing (October
2008), it is hard to predict how much the tides will move towards re-regulation.
Much has also been written about the political cycle and reforms.13 Conven-
tional wisdom suggests that governments should not introduce reforms close to
elections and that, in general, liberalizing and/or ﬁscally conservative reforms
lead to electoral losses. Thus, if a government has a chance of introducing re-
forms, it ought to do so soon after it is appointed for two possible reasons: ﬁrst,
to take advantage of the honeymoon period, and second, because the short-term
costs of reforms will be gone before the next election. We examine the timing
of reforms in relation to the electoral cycle, and we do ﬁnd some evidence that
reforms tend to occur at the beginning of a new term. As for the likelihood
that the reforming government will lose the next election, one has to maintain a
healthy dose of skepticism with regard to “conventional wisdom.” For instance,
Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998) show that governments that engaged in
sharp ﬁscal adjustments have often been reappointed.
3 Product markets: the evidence
3.1 The data on regulation
We use yearly data on 21 OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, the UK, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden,
and the US) covering a maximum time span from 1975 to 2003. The data
come from a variety of diﬀerent sources. In the next sections, we describe the
regulatory, macroeconomic and political data; Appendix A1 includes the exact
deﬁnition and source of each variable we use in the empirical analysis.
We use time-varying measures of regulation for seven non-manufacturing
industries in 21 OECD countries for the period 1975-2003. The data have been
collected by Conway and Nicoletti (2007) from both national sources (by means
of speciﬁc surveys) and published sources and are described in detail by Nicoletti
and Scarpetta (2003). The regulatory indicators measure, on a scale from 0
to 6 (from least to most restrictive), restrictions on competition and private
governance in the following industries: electricity and gas supply, road freight,
air passenger transport, rail transport, post and telecommunications (ﬁxed and
mobile).
The summary index of regulation includes information on entry barriers,
public ownership, the market share of the dominant player(s) (in the telephone,
gas and railroad sectors), and price controls (in the road freight industry). En-
try barriers cover legal limitations on the number of companies in potentially
12See Alesina and Giavazzi (2006) for a recent discussion of potential European decline due
to insuﬃcient reforms.
13See Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) for work on the political business cycles and
Brender and Drazen (2005) for a political budget cycle model.
9competitive markets and rules on vertical integration of network industries. The
barriers to entry indicator takes a value of 0 when entry is free (i.e., a situa-
tion with three or more competitors and with complete ownership separation
of natural monopoly and competitive segments of the industry) and a value
of 6 when entry is severely restricted (i.e., situations with legal monopoly and
full vertical integration in network industries or restrictive licensing in other
industries). Intermediate values represent partial liberalization of entry (e.g.,
legal duopoly, mere accounting separation of natural monopoly and competitive
segments). Public ownership measures the share of equity owned by central or
municipal governments in ﬁrms of a given sector. The two polar cases are no
public ownership (a value of 0 for the indicator) and full public ownership (a
value of 6 for the indicator). Whenever data are available (i.e., telecoms, air
transport), intermediate values of the public ownership indicator are calculated
as an increasing function of the actual share of equity held by the government
in the dominant ﬁrm. In some cases (e.g., the energy industries), a simpler scale
is used, pointing to full or majority control by the government (a value of 6),
various degrees of mixed public/private ownership (intermediate values), and
marginal public share or full private ownership (a value of 0).
The construction of the indicators by the OECD involved the following steps:
First, they separated indicators for barriers to entry, public ownership, and mar-
ket share of new entrants, and price controls were created at the ﬁnest available
level of industry disaggregation (e.g., mobile and ﬁxed telephony). Second, they
aggregated indicators at the industry level, taking simple averages or revenue-
weighted averages (when aggregating horizontal segments of industries, such as
mobile and ﬁxed telephony). Third, they computed the index of overall regula-
tion by averaging, in each of the seven industries, the indicators of barriers to
entry, public ownership, market share of new entrants, and price controls.
Here, we used simple averaging of the indices to reach the level of indus-
try aggregation for which macroeconomic data (value added, labor costs, and
employment) are available. More speciﬁcally, we have aggregated the regula-
tion indices for the seven sectors in three broader sectors: energy (electricity
and gas), communication (telecommunications and post), and transportation
(airlines, road freight and railways).
In our benchmark regressions, we use the regulatory indicator REG,w h i c h
includes all dimensions except public ownership. In the sensitivity analysis, we
also consider three other indicators of regulation: the overall indicator including
all the regulation dimensions; one indicator which summarizes barriers to entry
(comprising legal restrictions and vertical integration); and one indicator which
includes only public ownership information.
In the augmented regressions, we introduced two additional sectors: retail
and professionals. Data on regulation in these two sectors in 21 OECD countries
are available only for two years: 1996 (for professionals) or 1998 (for retail)
and 2003. These regulatory indicators range from 0 to 6 (from least to most
restrictive). In the retail sector, they capture three components: barrier to
entry, operational restrictions and price control. For the professionals, indicators
measure entry regulations and conduct regulations in four sectors: accounting,
10architect, engineer and legal services. For a detailed description, see Conway
and Nicoletti (2007).
3.2 The macroeconomic and political data
The economic data on value added, labor costs, and total employment at the
country-sector-year level for the period 1975-2003 come from the OECD STAN
database for Industrial Analysis, Revision 3 (ISIC Rev. 3). This database
covers both services and manufacturing sectors for the OECD countries. The
macroeconomic data for the non-manufacturing sectors for which we have in-
dices of regulation are available at the following level of industry aggregation:
(i) electricity, gas and water, (ii) communications and posts, and (iii) transport
and storage. From now on, we will name the sectors deﬁned in (i), (ii),a n d
(iii) energy, communications, and transport, respectively. We merge the data
from STAN data set with the database containing the regulation indices. As
mentioned above, because data on value added, labor costs, and total employ-
ment are not available for each single industry for which regulation indices exist,
we mapped the industry-level regulatory indicators into the non-manufacturing
aggregates covered by the STAN database.
Macroeconomic data at the country-year level are from the OECD Economic
Outlook n. 80 database. Finally, the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) of
the World Bank, compiled by Beck, Clarke, Groﬀ, Keefer, and Walsh (2001) and
updated in 2004, contains all the political variables employed in the analysis.
3.3 Patterns of product market deregulation
Starting in the late seventies, OECD countries have initiated a broad-based
process of deregulation. They were not all starting from the same initial position,
however. Generally speaking, Anglo-Saxon countries (the US in particular)
were less regulated than continental European countries, and they started to
deregulate early: the US and the UK in the early eighties, New Zealand in the
late seventies, Ireland in the late eighties. In the last two decades, there has
been convergence: the diﬀerence in the degree of regulation of product markets
(at least for the sector for which we have data) is lower now than it was in the
early eighties. The laggards are catching on.
In what follows, we divide the countries into three groups: 1) those that
adopted the Euro (the EMU group): these countries are Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain;
2) those which are part of the European Union but did not adopt the Euro (we
called them the European Single Market Group or ESM): these countries are
Denmark, Sweden, and the UK; and 3) those which are not in the EU and
obviously do not have the Euro: these are Australia, Canada, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the US.
Figure 1 shows that all sectors have deregulated, communication more than
any other and energy less than any other. Figure 2 shows that non-EU countries
have deregulated less, but, as we said before, they were starting from a much
11lower average level of regulation. The Single Market group has deregulated
most, but in the period 1999-2003, the EU countries have picked up momentum,
having done very little until then, especially given their high initial level of
regulation. With the exception of Ireland, very few EU countries did much in
terms of deregulation in the eighties, so leaving Ireland out, the pattern for the
EU countries would be even more skewed towards the recent period. The EMS
group includes the UK, which started deregulation early, like other English-
speaking countries, and also Nordic countries, which have deregulated quite a
lot, and this shows in these pictures. Figure 3 shows some pattern of convergence
in the deregulation process: since 1999, the countries which deregulated more
were clearly those which had higher degrees of regulation until the mid-nineties.
3.4 The Euro and product markets reforms - benchmark
speciﬁcations
All our regressions in this section and in the tables discussed in the next sections
are estimated with Generalized Least Squares allowing for heteroschedasticity
of the error term; they include the lagged value of the left-hand side variable
and country, sector and time dummies. Sensitivity analysis conﬁrms that all
the results are robust to controlling for country sector-speciﬁc dummies, time
trends, and country-speciﬁc time trends.
I nT a b l e1 ,w ee s t i m a t eo u rb a s i cs p e c i ﬁcation of the level of regulation
(measured by the indicator variable REG). The ﬁrst three columns include data
on the three sectors of transportation, energy, and communications; columns 4-6
also include the two additional sectors: retail and professionals. We measure
the impact of the single market program and of the euro on regulation with the
dummy variables ESM and EMU. Speciﬁcally, ESM is an indicator variable
equal to 1 from 1993 onwards for all countries that belong to the European Union
(i.e., Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) and equal to 0
otherwise. EMU is an indicator variable equal to 1 from 1999 onward only for
those countries of the European Union that have adopted the euro (i.e., Austria,
Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain) and equal to zero otherwise.
Column 1 shows that both the single market and the euro have accelerated
deregulation: the coeﬃcients of ESM and EMU are negative (equal to −0.064
and −0.18 respectively) and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better.
Interestingly, the adoption of the Euro has had a larger (about three times as
large) impact on regulation than that of the single market program, and for
a country that participated in the single market and adopted the Euro, our
estimates imply that the level of regulation decreased by about −0.25 points.
In column 2, we check whether these results hold for each sector in our
sample. The adoption of the Euro was especially important for energy and
communications, while the single market was key for transportation and had no
12statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect in the energy and communication sectors.14
F i n a l l y ,w ei n v e s t i g a t ew h e t h e rt h ee ﬀect of the single market program and
the adoption of the Euro depends on the initial level of regulation by adding the
variables ESM∗REG(−1) and EMU∗REG(−1) to the speciﬁcation of column
2. The eﬀect of the single market is independent of the level of regulation: the
coeﬃcient of the interaction term between the single market dummy and the
level of regulation lagged one is not statistically signiﬁcant both in a speciﬁcation
in which we exclude the variable EMU ∗ REG(−1) a n di no n ei nw h i c hw e
include it (results are not shown but are available upon request).
On the contrary, column 3 shows that the eﬀect of the Euro was larger
the larger the initial level of regulation, reemphasizing the process of conver-
gence mentioned above. Note that, in column 3, the coeﬃcients of the dummy
variable EMU in the energy and communication sectors become positive but
insigniﬁcant (see column 3). However, the magnitude of the coeﬃcients of
the variables EMU_ENERGY,a n dEMU_COMMUNICATIONS and of
EMU ∗ REG(−1) imply that, for each value of REG(−1) observed in the en-
ergy and communications sectors, adopting the Euro is always associated with
deregulation.
The last three columns of Table 1 reestimate the speciﬁcations of column
1-3 in the sample in which the two additional sectors, retail and professionals,
are also included. The estimates show that the single market, not the Euro, was
important for the retail sector and that the professional sectors has not been
deregulated at all.
Finally, the regulatory variable that we are using (REG) looks at “all” as-
pects of regulation except the one of public ownership. Results hold when we
use the indicator of regulation that only measures barriers to entry and vertical
integration and the more general indicator that also looks at public ownership.
Summarizing, the introduction of the Euro has contributed to structural re-
forms in the product markets. This eﬀect is above and beyond the eﬀect of mem-
bership in the European Union from 1993 onwards. Moreover, deregulation was
stronger in EMU country-sectors with higher initial levels of regulation. This
may give some prima-facie and indirect support to the idea that deregulation
was most needed once countries could not rely on exchange rate devaluations to
boost competitiveness. In fact, the more heavily regulated (and less productive
and competitive) country-sectors may have been those suﬀering the most from
the loss of competitive devaluations and, hence, the ones that were forced to
liberalize the most. In the next section, we investigate this idea in more detail.
14We also checked whether the countries that deregulated after the adoption of the Euro
in the years following 1999 had experienced a "delay" in deregulation because they were "too
busy" achieving the target criteria to join the monetary union. More speciﬁcally, we tested
what happened to EU countries in the run up to the Euro during the period 1993-99. We did
not ﬁnd any evidence of an eﬀect of "postponement."
133.5 Why should the Euro matter? - empirical evidence
One of the reasons why a country joining the EMU may want to adopt structural
reforms is that the competitive devaluation channel is not available anymore as
a tool (or a palliative) to regain competitiveness.15 In Table 2, we explore this
idea. Lacking competitiveness indicators at the country-sector-year level for
the period 1975-2003 for the energy, communications, and transport sectors, we
measure competitiveness with variables varying only along the country-year di-
mension. We use two diﬀerent indicators: the growth rate of the CPI relative to
competitors at t-1 (COMPET1(−1))a n dt h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h ee x p o r tg o o d s
deﬂators relative to competitors at t-1 (COMPET2(−1)). We include the linear
and quadratic terms to capture for possible non-linearities; we add the interac-
tion term of the competitiveness indicators and the EMU dummy variable to
investigate whether the loss of exchange rate devaluation as a policy instrument
to boost competitiveness leads to structural reforms. The coeﬃcients of the
variables COMPET1(−1) and COMPET2(−1) and their squares are not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at conventional critical values, suggesting that deregulation
reforms do not generally occur in countries that are loosing competitiveness.
However, this is not true for countries that adopted the Euro. In fact, the inter-
action terms of the competitiveness indicators and the EMU dummy variable
are negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, suggesting that, for
EMU countries, the higher the growth rate of CPI and export goods deﬂators
relative to competitors at t-1, the larger the decrease of the regulatory index.
Finally, in columns 3 and 6, we control for the number of devaluations countries
that adopted the Euro experienced in the period 1979-1993. Our idea is that
only countries that de facto used the exchange rate as a tool to regain compet-
itiveness should suﬀer from its loss and liberalize markets. The variable N. OF
DEVALUATIONS FROM 1979-1993 is equal to 5 for France, 1 for Belgium, 7
for Italy and 3 for Ireland. It is equal to 0 otherwise. For the EMU countries,
the more devaluations a country did from 1979 to 1993, the larger the decrease
of the regulatory index (but the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant only at the
10% level).
Two caveats are worth mentioning. First, we are treating our competitive-
ness indicators as exogenous. While this may clearly not be the case, note that,
here, we are not really interested in the eﬀect of competitiveness on regulation
but on its diﬀerential eﬀect among EMU and other countries. Hence, even if
the competitiveness indicators were not exogenous, it is not clear why the bias
in our estimates should diﬀer among EMU and other countries. Second, the
coeﬃcient of the variable EMU ∗ REG(−1) remains negative and statistically
signiﬁcant as in Table 1, suggesting that: (i) our competitiveness indicators are
not capturing the loss of competitiveness, and hence the need of reforms, very
well when the exchange rate instrument cannot be used anymore; (ii) the Euro
15The paper by Bugamelli, Schivardi and Zizza in this volume presents some microeco-
nomic evidence suggesting that sectors that have gone through deeper transformations and
that enjoyed more productivity gains are exactly those that beneﬁted more from pre-1999
devaluation.
14is important for structural reforms in product markets for other reasons beyond
the fact that the competitive devaluation channel is not available anymore; (iii)
what we are identifying as a "Euro eﬀect" is just picking up the impact of some
omitted variable; (iv) any combinations of (i), (ii), and/or (iii).
3.6 Other determinants of product market reforms
In this section, we investigate other possible determinants of product market
reforms. We also check that accounting for other critical elements that drive
reforms does not alter the results we discussed so far on the eﬀect of the Euro
on deregulation of product markets.
We begin by testing whether various variables that measure the macroeco-
nomic conditions of each sectors matter. Speciﬁcally, in Table 3, we include
the sectors’ value added, labor expenses and total employment at time t-1,
measured as a share of country’s total value added, labor expenses, and total
employment at time t-1. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) suggest that, in the
short run, product markets’ deregulation reforms generate costs both for in-
cumbent ﬁrms and for their workers. Hence, incumbents tend to oppose such
reforms. When rents are lower, however, resistance to deregulation falls as the
incumbents’ short-term losses can be easier outweighed by the future beneﬁts of
deregulation. Results in Table 3 support this argument. In fact, we ﬁnd that reg-
ulation decreases when value added and labor costs of the sector fall, i.e., when
the sector’s rents decrease. We also ﬁnd that product markets are deregulated
in country-sectors-years with lower employment. Hence, in less labor-intensive
sectors, governments can meet less resistance and can more easily implement
deregulation measures. In columns 4-6, we also investigate whether there are
diﬀerential eﬀects between EMU and non-EMU countries relative to the eﬀects
of value added, labor costs and employment on regulation, but on this score, we
found no diﬀerences between EMU and non-EMU countries.
Second, in Table 4, we augment the speciﬁcations of Table 3 with several
macroeconomic and political controls. We investigate the "crisis" hypothesis,
t h er o l eo ft h ec o u n t r i e s ’ﬁscal conditions, the timing of reforms in relation to the
electoral cycle, the interaction between reforms in the product and labor markets
and the eﬀect of reforms occurring in trading partners’ countries. All variables
are measured at time t-1, both to allow for the fact that it may take some time
until governments react to macroeconomic events and to reduce the possibility
of reverse causality in our estimates. Several results are worth noting. First,
the results on EMU shown thus far are robust to the inclusion of the additional
control variables. Second, we ﬁnd evidence that deregulation reforms occur in
country-years in which the output gap (deﬁned as the diﬀerence of actual output
to potential) is below the 90th percentile of the output gap empirical density
(equal to -3.4%). This gives some support to the crisis hypothesis, namely that
reforms are more likely to occur in bad times. Third, the higher the primary
deﬁcit as a share of GDP, the lower the level of regulation, indicating that
reforms’ blockers may be less powerful when they feel that public ﬁnances are
also in trouble and that liberalizing the economy can help both in boosting
15growth and maybe in reducing the likelihood of further increases in taxes or
cutting in spending. Fourth, we ﬁnd some evidence that product market reforms
happen at the beginning of the political term (right after an election), but this
result is not particularly robust to speciﬁcation changes. Fifth, deregulation in
trading partners fosters deregulation at home. This result is consistent with the
evidence in Hoj et al (2006).
Finally, we looked into the interaction between labor market reforms and
product market reforms. Speciﬁcally, our estimates show that an increase in
unemployment beneﬁts leads to lower regulation in product markets, while a
decrease in the employment protection index is associated with less regulation of
product markets (but the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 10% level only in column
5). Product market liberalization reforms seem easier to implement if workers
receive some kind of protection in the form of social insurance. As mentioned
above, workers of the incumbent ﬁrms are more likely to become unemployed
and lose in the short run from deregulation. Hence, they can be more willing to
bear the short-run costs once the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts increases
than otherwise. Fiori et al. (2007) ﬁnd that labor market reforms do not
Granger-cause product market reforms. However, their labor market indicator is
the principal component of unemployment beneﬁts and employment protection.
Results in Table 4 show that the two variables have opposite eﬀects on regulation
in product market. Hence, considering a combination of the two variables may
prevent one from detecting any eﬀect of labor market regulation on product
market regulation.
3.7 Endogeneity of Euro membership
The decision to join the EMS and especially to adopt the Euro is, of course, not
an exogenous variable. In order to investigate this issue, we have reestimated
Table 1 using an instrumental variable procedure. First, we have estimated,
with a probit model, the probability that a certain country adopts the Euro.
The choice of the right-hand side variable is based upon the gravity literature
on trade and the literature on currency unions.16 The speciﬁcation, described
in detail in the appendix, is meant to capture that: i) countries that trade more
with each other should be more likely to choose to be part of the same common
currency area; ii) the higher the correlation of the business cycle frequency
(output and prices), the more likely it is that two countries will choose to join
the union; and iii) the higher past inﬂation, the more likely it is that a country
will join the union. In fact, the more two countries trade with each other,
t h em o r et h e yb e n e ﬁt from a common currency. The more correlated are their
business cycles, the lower the costs of a simple monetary policy. Finally a history
of high inﬂation makes a monetary anchor especially eﬀective. As we discuss in
the appendix, we ﬁnd support, with regard to EMU, for the ﬁrst two eﬀects but
not for the third17. This is not surprising, since the monetary anchor argument
16See Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002) in particular.
17Also Rose (2000) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and negative impact of the inﬂation rate on the prob-
ability of joining a currency union.
16certainly did not apply to low-inﬂation members, e.g., Germany and France.
We then use the estimated probability of joining the union as an instrumental
variable for Table 1. The results, described in the appendix, show that the
coeﬃcients of interests on EMU in Column 1 of Table 1 are generally robust to
this IV procedure. We have investigated all the speciﬁcations of Table 1 with
various degrees of success. In some cases, the IV results remain signiﬁcant, while
in some cases the standard errors are too big for statistical signiﬁcance. As we
discussed in the Introduction, we are not convinced that the decision to enter
the Euro area or not was exogenous only (or mainly) to economic variables.
Political consideration seemed crucial, and therefore it is hard to measure the
decision of whether to join with an instrument.
4 Labor market: the evidence
4.1 The data
In order to investigate the determinants of labor market regulation, we consider
two time-varying measures for 21 OECD countries for the period 1985-2003.
These two measures capture the degree of employment protection related to the
ﬁring decisions and the level of insurance provided to the unemployed, respec-
tively. Data on the former measures are coded and collected by the OECD and
described in the OECD Employment Outlook (2004). The latter data are also
collected at the OECD, Beneﬁts and Wages (several issues); since original data
are available only for odd years, data for even years have been obtained by linear
interpolation.
The indicator on employment protection ranges from 0 to 6 (from least to
most restrictive) and measures the restrictions placed on the ﬁring processes by
both labor legislation and collective bargaining agreements. This index includes
an assessment of the legislative provisions, as well as the enforcement dimension,
as they provide a measure of the judicial practices and court interpretations of
legislative and contractual rules. This indicator is also provided separately for
regular and temporary workers.
For the regular workers, the indicator on the employment protectory reg-
ulation has three main components: i) diﬃculty of dismissal, i.e., legislative
provisions setting conditions under which a dismissal is “justiﬁed” or “fair;”
ii) procedural inconveniences that the employer may face when starting the
dismissal process; and iii) notice and severance pay provisions. The index also
provides a measure of the regulation of ﬁxed-term contracts and temporary work
agencies. This is intended to measure the restrictions on the use of temporary
employment by ﬁrms with respect to the type of work for which these contracts
are allowed and their duration. The employment legislation for regular contracts
constitutes the core component of the overall summary index of EPL strictness
that we use.
The indicator on the level of insurance provided to the unemployed represents
the unemployment beneﬁt replacement rate for low-income workers in their 1st
17year of unemployment. This is measured by the average replacement rate, i.e.,
the ratio of the unemployment beneﬁt to the last wage, for a worker that earns
66% of average worker earnings.
4.2 The Euro and labor market reforms
As for the product market, all our regressions are estimated with Generalized
Least Squares, allowing for heteroschedasticity of the error term, and include
the lagged value of the left-hand side variable and country and time dummies.
In Table 5, we consider the generosity of the unemployment beneﬁt, as de-
ﬁned above, to be a measure of labor market regulation. In column 1, we start
from the basic speciﬁcation with only tests for the eﬀects of the European Single
Market and of the EURO. We then add the interaction of EMU with the lagged
value of the depended variable (column 2), our measures of competition (column
3), and additional possible explanatory variables encountered in the literature,
such as economic crisis and ﬁscal and political variables (column 4). Finally,
columns 5 and 6 report the results of the regressions that include the eﬀects of
the lagged variable of regulation in the product market, the alternative variable
of regulation in the labor market (EPL) and the level of unemployment beneﬁts
in the trading partners. The results show that, while the ESM had no impact
on this measure of labor market regulation, the introduction of the EURO led
to an increase in the generosity of the unemployment beneﬁt. No other variable
shows any explanatory power, with the exception of the level of unemployment
beneﬁts in the trading partners, which, however, presents a puzzling result, since
more UB in trading partners is associated with less UB in the home country.
When using the degree of employment protective legislation (EPL) as a
measure of labor market regulation, as in table 6, we do not ﬁnd any eﬀect of
EMU — or any other plausible explanatory variable — on labor market reforms.
More generally, we found that this index of labor market reform moved much
less than that of product market, as shown at ﬁgure 4.
4.3 Additional Evidence
The indicator of labor market reform used in the previous section may give an
overly narrow view of the evolution of labor markets in Europe. These indicators
of ﬂexibility refer only to the "primary" labor market. But two other factors,
related to each other, have changed. One has been the development of a vast
labor market in several countries based on temporary contracts with very few,
if any, of the rigidities of the primary labor market. For instance, much of the
increase in employment reported in France, Italy and Spain has occurred in this
secondary market. The second change is that, in the last ten or ﬁfteen years,
several European countries seem to have experienced a substantial amount of
wage moderation. In Table 7, we investigated whether the adoption of the Euro
has contributed to achieving wage moderation in these seemingly unreformed
labor markets. This is, of course, important as an indicator of second-round
eﬀects: i.e., whether or not inﬂationary shocks get a "second-round" boost from
18wage increases. This table shows that the countries that joined the EMU in
1999 have experienced a signiﬁcant increase in wage moderation in the period
leading up to the common currency: i.e., between 1993 and 1999. After this
period, there is no evidence of an additional eﬀect of Euro adoption on the
degree of wage moderation. These results are consistent with the fact that, in
preparation for EMU membership, many countries had to "put their houses in
order." This meant inﬂation reduction and ﬁscal rigor (in areas including public
salaries).
More speciﬁcally, in column 1 of Table 7, the dependent variable is the
growth of nominal wages. On the right-hand side, in addition to the lagged
dependent variable, we have lagged inﬂation and our variables capturing simple
market membership and EMU membership. The former (but not the latter)
has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, indicating, at least at ﬁrst
sight, an eﬀect of simple market membership on wage moderation. However,
in Column 2, we show that this result is driven by the countries’ membership
of the simple market and their preparation to join the EMU and attempts to
achieve convergence criteria. In fact, we added a dummy for EMU countries
in the run up to the Euro (1993-1998) and another one after they adopted
the single currency. As this column shows, the pre-Euro dummy variable has
as i g n i ﬁcant negative coeﬃcient. Meanwhile, the coeﬃcient on the post-Euro
period is insigniﬁcant. We also investigated possible diﬀerential eﬀects between
EMU and non-EMU countries relative to the eﬀects of (lagged) inﬂation, but
we found no diﬀerences.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Our statistical analysis suggests that the adoption of the Euro has had a sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect in promoting the adoption of product market reforms, at least in
some sectors.
There are three possible interpretations of the results. One is that it is simply
a coincidence: some countries decided to reform right at the end of the nineties,
and this time period happened to coincide with the adoption of the Euro. The
second interpretation is that the Euro did indeed have an eﬀect in promoting
liberalization by eliminating the palliative of competitive devaluations. Firms
found themselves losing competitiveness and became more vocal in demanding
liberalization in sectors which were providing intermediate goods and services
(including non-tradable ones) in order to keep their costs low. A third story,
related to the second, is that the Euro did not matter that much economically
per se but that it was used as a political tool by reformers to argue that countries
belonging to the Euro area needed structural reform; in other words, the Euro
was used as a justiﬁcation to promote a product market reform agenda.
One should be worried about the possibility of spurious correlations because
of the relatively small number of countries involved in the tests; however, the
results do appear quite robust to a battery of econometric tests. It is hard
to entirely disentangle the role of actual economic pressures introduced by the
19Euro and the political rhetoric associated with it, but certainly the results of
our econometric exercise have moved us from our prior assumptions towards
believing that the Euro might indeed have had an eﬀect in, if not promoting, at
least weakening the opposition to product market reforms. Future work should
take some further steps towards trying to disentangle these three alternatives.
One step in this direction would be to focus on where the political and economic
pressure to liberalize certain sectors came from.18
The adoption of the Euro does not seem to have had much of an eﬀect in
promoting labor market reforms, at least in the primary labor market sector: in
general, labor markets have proceeded more slowly and tentatively than product
markets. However, a secondary labor market with temporary labor contracts
has grown in a few countries which did not reform the primary labor market. In
addition, the run up Euro adoption has led to some wage moderation. This tim-
ing has led us to consider the question of whether product market reform should
indeed precede labor market liberalization. We ﬁnd that regulation decreases
when value added and labor costs of the sector fall, i.e., when a sector’s rents de-
crease, and that product markets are deregulated in country-sectors-years with
lower employment. Hence, in less labor-intensive sectors, governments can meet
less resistance and can more easily implement deregulation measures. How-
ever, we also ﬁnd that product market deregulation is easier to implement when
unemployment subsidies are more generous and more diﬃcult when there are
higher ﬁring costs, which interfere with market reallocations. Therefore, the
type of labor market policies more prone to facilitating product market reforms
are those in which the workers are protected with unemployment subsidies but
speciﬁc jobs are not, making the (re)matching between ﬁrms and workers easier.
Labor market reforms are multidimensional in nature and are often quite com-
plex and diﬃcult to capture with one macro indicator. Also, several countries in
the Euro area have two separate markets: the traditional and highly regulated
market and a second, much more ﬂexible, one based on temporary contracts.
Further investigation into the role of the Euro in promoting labor market reform
is an excellent topic for future research.
18Interestingly, energy, the sector that was mostly aﬀected by the introduction of the EURO,
was found by Barone and Cingano (2008) to be the service sector, whose liberalization has
the most beneﬁcial eﬀects on the growth rate of the down-stream manufacturing sectors.
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23Appendix A: The IV Estimation
In the ﬁrst stage, we compute the probability that a country joins the EURO
using variables from a gravity equation, as well as variables of bilateral trade
and past inﬂation. More speciﬁcally, we run a probit estimation of the probabil-
ity of joining the EURO on the following set of explanatory variables. Gravity
equation variables include the share of the population of a country over the to-
tal population in the 11 EMU countries (population1sh); the share of land mass
of a country over the total land mass in the 11 EMU countries (area1sh); the
correlation shocks in prices (Prmse) and output (Yrmse) of a country relative
to the other 11 EMU countries; the number of the 11 EMU countries a country
shares borders with (border); the number of the 11 EMU countries a country
shares a common language with (comlang); the number of the 11 EMU coun-
tries a country was ever in colonial relationship with (colony). Bilateral trade
variables are constructed using annual data from the OECD Bilateral database
and measure the (nominal and real) sum of import and export that a country
had with the other 11 EMU countries. We use lagged values of either the annual
measure (laglnrtrade and laglntrade) or of the average over a ﬁve-year period,
such as 1960-64, 1965-70, and so on (lpastlnrtrade and lpastlntrade). All trade
variables are in logs. Inﬂation variables are constructed using the GDP deﬂator
taken from the WDI database. We use either the inﬂation rate in a country or
the diﬀerence between the inﬂation rate in a country and the average inﬂation
in the other 11 EMU countries. As for the trade variables, we use lagged val-
ues of either the annual measure (respectively, laginﬂwdi1 and laginﬂdeveu11)
or of the average over a ﬁve year-period, such as 1960-64, 1965-70, and so on
(respectively, lpastinﬂwdi1 and lpastinﬂdeveu11). We do not include country or
year dummies.
The results of the ﬁrst stage are reported in table A1. As expected, countries
that are smaller in population size (but not land size), with more correlated
output shocks, with more common borders and which trade more with other
EMU countries, are more likely to join the EURO. Having a common language
instead reduces the probability of joining the EURO. Small inﬂation diﬀerentials
with the other 11 EMU countries are not signiﬁcant in explaining the decision
to join the EURO, while a lower inﬂation is more conducive to the decision to
join. This last result is in line with the estimates in Rose (2000).
In the second stage, we use the predicted probability of joining the EURO
from the ﬁrst stage to instrument the EMU variable. Table A2 reports the
results of the second stage, in which we include all the control variables used
in table 1 in the paper, as well as country, sector, and year dummies. Only the
coeﬃcient on the (instrumented) EMU is reported. Notice that each column in
table A2 can be associated to the corresponding ﬁrst stage in table A1.
24Appendix B: Data Sources and Deﬁnitions
Our data set includes yearly data on 21 OECD countries (Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France,
the UK, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Sweden, and the US) from 1975 to 2003. Here is a list of variables
used in our regressions, with their deﬁnitions and sources.
REG: Aggregation of the OECD summary indicator of regulatory impedi-
ments to product market competition, excluding public ownership, in three or
ﬁve broad sectors: energy (electricity and gas), communication (telecommuni-
cations and post), and transportation (airlines, road freight and railways); and
retail and professionals. Data on regulation in professionals are only available
in 1996 and 2003 and for retail in 1998 and 2003. Source: Conway and Nicoletti
(2007) and Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003).
ENERGY, COMMUNICATIONS, TRANSPORT, RETAIL and PROFES-
SIONAL: Sectorial dummy variable that equals 1 for the corresponding sector.
European Single Market (ESM): Dummy variable that equals 1 for the coun-
tries that enter the EU’s Single Market Programme after its implementation in
1993.
EMU: Dummy variable that equals 1 for the countries that enter the EMU
after its implementation in 1999.
EMU"variable": Interaction between EMU and the corresponding variable.
ESM"variable": Interaction between Single Market and the corresponding
variable.
COMPET1: Indicator of lack of competitiveness at the country-sector-year
level for the period 1975-2003 for the energy, communications, and transport
sectors, measured as the growth rate of the CPI relative to competitors at t−1.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook n. 80.
COMPET2: Indicator of lack of competitiveness at the country-sector-year
level for the period 1975-2003 for the energy, communications, and transport
sectors, measured as the growth rate of the export goods deﬂators relative to
competitors at t − 1. Source: OECD Economic Outlook n. 80.
N. OF DEVALUTIONS FROM 1979-1993: Number of devaluations that
a country that belonged to the European Monetary System did from 1979 to
1993.
VA: Value added for the three sectors: Energy (electricity, gas and water),
Communications (communications and posts), and Transport (transport and
storage). It measures the sector contribution to national GDP, calculated as
the diﬀerence between Production and Intermediate inputs. Source: OECD
STAN database for Industrial Analysis, Revision 3 (ISIC Rev. 3)
LABOUR EXPENSES: Labor costs or compensation of employees in the
three sectors above. It includes wages and salaries of employees paid by pro-
ducers, as well as supplements such as contributions to social security, private
pensions, health insurance, life insurance and similar schemes. Source: OECD
STAN database for Industrial Analysis, Revision 3 (ISIC Rev. 3)
25TOTEMPLOYMENT: Total Employment in the three sectors above. Source:
OECD STAN database for Industrial Analysis, Revision 3 (ISIC Rev. 3)
CRISIS: Dummy variable equal to 1 when the output gap (deﬁned as the
diﬀerence of actual output to potential) is below the 90th percentile of the output
gap empirical density (equal to −3.4%). Source: OECD Economic Outlook
database.
PRIMARYSURPLUS/GDP: Primary deﬁcit as a share of GDP. Source:
OECD Economic Outlook database.
RIGHTGOV: Dummy variable that equals 1 if the government is led by a
Right party or coalition (Right: parties that are deﬁned as conservative, Chris-
tian democratic, or right-wing). Source: Database of Political Institutions (DPI)
of the World Bank, compiled by Beck, Clarke, Groﬀ, Keefer, and Walsh (2001)
CENTERGOV: Dummy variable that equals 1 if the government is led by
a Center party or coalition (parties that are deﬁned as centrist or when party
position can best be described as centrist, e.g., party advocates strengthening
private enterprise in a social-liberal context). Source: Database of Political
Institutions (DPI) of the World Bank, compiled by Beck, Clarke, Groﬀ,K e e f e r ,
and Walsh (2001).
ELECTIONYEAR: Dummy variable that equals 1 if (parliamentary or pres-
idential) elections were held during that year. Source: Database of Political
Institutions (DPI) of the World Bank, compiled by Beck, Clarke, Groﬀ,K e e f e r ,
and Walsh (2001).
REG TRADING PARTNERS: Average of the value of the indicators REG
for the trading partners. Source: Conway and Nicoletti (2007) and Nicoletti and
Scarpetta (2003) and OECD STAN database for Industrial Analysis, Revision
3( I S I CR e v .3 ) .
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT: Unemployment beneﬁt replacement rate for
low-income workers in their 1st year of unemployment. This is measured by the
average replacement rate, i.e., the ratio of the unemployment beneﬁtt ot h el a s t
wage, for a worker that earns 66% of average worker earnings. Source: OECD,
Beneﬁts and Wages.
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION: OECD summary indicator of the strin-
gency for Employment Protection Legislation for all contract, deﬁned as the av-
erage of values for the Indeﬁnite contract (regular) workers and the Fixed-term
contract (temporary) workers. Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 2004.
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT TRADING PARTNERS: Average of the
value of the indicator UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT for the trading partners.
Source: OECD, Beneﬁts and Wages and OECD STAN database for Industrial
Analysis, Revision 3 (ISIC Rev. 3).
PMKTREGULATION (−1 and −2): country average value (lagged one and
two periods) of the sectorial indicator REG.
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION TRADINGPARTNERS: Average of the
value of the indicators EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION for the trading part-
ners. Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 2004 and OECD STAN database
for Industrial Analysis, Revision 3 (ISIC Rev. 3).
26POPULATION1SH: The share of the population of a country over the total
population in the 11 EMU countries. Source: Tenreyro (2007).
AREA1SH: The share of land mass of a country over the total land mass in
the 11 EMU countries. Source: Tenreyro (2007).
PRMSE: The correlation shocks in prices of a country relative to the other
11 EMU countries. Source: Tenreyro (2007).
YRMSE: The correlation shocks in output of a country relative to the other
11 EMU countries. Source: Tenreyro (2007).
BORDER: The number of the 11 EMU countries with which a country shares
borders. Source: Tenreyro (2007).
COMLANG: The number of the 11 EMU countries with which a country
shares a common language. Source: Tenreyro (2007).
COLONY: The number of the 11 EMU countries with which a country was
ever in a colonial relationship. Source: Tenreyro (2007).
LPASTINLFWDI1: Lagged value of the average over a ﬁve-year period of
the inﬂation rate, measured using the GDP deﬂator, in a country. Source: World
Development Indicator Database.
LAGINFLDEVEU11: Lagged value of the diﬀerence between the inﬂation
rate, measured using the GDP deﬂator, in a country and the average inﬂation in
the other 11 EMU countries. Source: World Development Indicator Database.
LPASTINFLDEVEU11: Lagged value of the average over a ﬁve-year period
of the diﬀerence between the inﬂation rate, measured using the GDP deﬂator,
in a country and the average inﬂation in the other 11 EMU countries. Source:
World Development Indicator Database.
LAGINFLWDI1: Lagged value of the inﬂation rate, measured using the
GDP deﬂator, in a country. Source: World Development Indicator Database.
LPASTLNTRADE: Lagged value of the average over a ﬁve-year period of
the nominal sum of import and export that a country had with the other 11
EMU countries. Source: OECD Bilateral database.
LAGLNRTRADE: Lagged value of the real sum of import and export that
a country had with the other 11 EMU countries. Source: OECD Bilateral
database.
LPASTLNRTRADE: Lagged value of the average over a ﬁve-year period of
the real sum of import and export that a country had with the other 11 EMU
countries. Source: OECD Bilateral database.
LAGLNTRADE: Lagged value of the nominal sum of import and export
that a country had with the other 11 EMU countries. Source: OECD Bilateral
database.
27Table 1: The Euro and product markets reforms 
  3 SECTORS  5 SECTORS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  REG REG REG REG REG REG 
REG(-1)  0.94 0.93 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.95 
  (109.60)*** (107.19)*** (104.66)*** (112.17)*** (108.13)*** (104.96)*** 
ESM  -0.06    -0.06    
  (-2.28)**    (-2.05)**    
EMU  -0.18    -0.15    
  (-5.28)***    (-4.83)***    
ESM*ENERGY   0.02  0.01  0.03  0.01 
   (0.61)  (0.23)  (0.70)  (0.24) 
ESM*COMMUNICATION   -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03 
   (-0.81)  (-0.81)  (-0.72)  (-0.74) 
ESM*TRANSPORT   -0.16  -0.15  -0.16  -0.15 
   (-4.35)***  (-4.05)***  (-4.32)***  (-4.02)*** 
ESM*RETAIL       -0.26  -0.27 
       (-2.07)**  (-2.54)** 
ESM*PROFESSIONAL       0.22  0.24 
       (2.74)***  (2.87)*** 
EMU*ENERGY   -0.43  0.04   -0.43  0.11 
   (-9.07)***  (0.49)   (-8.95)***  (1.23) 
EMU*COMMUNICATION   -0.28  0.02   -0.29  0.06 
   (-5.74)***  (0.31)   (-5.79)***  (0.86) 
EMU*TRANSPORT   0.11  0.46  0.11  0.50 
   (2.39)**  (6.26)***   (2.35)**  (6.98)*** 
EMU*RETAIL       0.52  0.85 
       (4.16)***  (5.75)*** 
EMU*PROFESSIONAL       -0.09  0.29 
       (-1.14)  (2.94)*** 
EMU*REG(-1)     -0.12     -0.14 
     (-6.24)***     (-7.34)*** 
        
OBSERVATIONS  1764 1764 1764 1802 1802 1802 
Notes: Generalized least squares regressions allowing for heteroschedasticity of the error term 
and including country, sector and time dummies. T-statisitcs in parenthesis. ***, **, * 
coefficients statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. REG indicator of 
regulatory impediments to product market competition, excluding public ownership; ENERGY, 
COMMUNICATIONS, TRANSPORT, RETAIL and PROFESSIONAL sectorial dummy variable that equals 1 for the 
corresponding sector; ESM dummy variable equal to 1 from 1993 onward for the countries that enter 
the EU's Single Market Programme; EMU dummy variable equal to 1 from 1999 onward for the 
countries that enter the EMU. Columns (1)-(3) include the following 3 sectors: ENERGY, 
COMMUNICATIONS, TRANSPORT. Columns (4)-(6) include all 5 sectors in our database: ENERGY, 
COMMUNICATIONS, TRANSPORT, RETAIL and PROFESSIONAL. See also Appendix B for the exact definition 


















 Table 2: The Euro, product markets reforms, and competitiveness 
  3 SECTORS  5 SECTORS 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  REG REG REG  REG REG REG 
REG(-1)  0.95 0.94 0.95  0.95 0.94 0.95 
  (101.60)*** (92.94)*** (104.17)*** (101.85)*** (93.51)*** (104.47)*** 
ESM*ENERGY  0.00 0.00 0.01  0.00 0.00 0.01 
  (0.12) (0.08) (0.23)  (0.10) (0.02) (0.24) 
ESM*COMMUNICATION  -0.03 -0.02 -0.03  -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
  (-0.84) (-0.65) (-0.83)  (-0.75) (-0.52) (-0.76) 
ESM*TRANSPORT  -0.16 -0.15 -0.15  -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 
  (-4.37)*** (-3.89)*** (-4.05)***  (-4.31)*** (-3.82)*** (-4.02)*** 
ESM*RETAIL      -0.27  -0.26  -0.27 
      (-2.44)**  (-2.18)**  (-2.52)** 
ESM*PROFESSIONAL      0.23  0.22  0.24 
      (2.71)***  (2.76)***  (2.87)*** 
EMU*ENERGY  0.23 0.20 0.03  0.31 0.28 0.10 
 (2.38)**  (1.92)*  (0.30)  (3.42)***  (3.05)***  (1.10) 
EMU*COMMUNICATION 0.14 0.12 0.02  0.19 0.17 0.06 
 (1.95)*  (1.56)  (0.28)  (2.76)***  (2.41)**  (0.84) 
EMU*TRANSPORT  0.56 0.54 0.44  0.61 0.59 0.49 
  (7.37)*** (6.66)*** (6.06)***  (8.43)*** (8.09)*** (6.84)*** 
EMU*RETAIL      1.01  0.95  0.85 
      (6.73)***  (5.99)***  (5.83)*** 
EMU*PROFESSIONAL      0.51  0.46  0.27 
      (4.91)***  (5.08)***  (2.74)*** 
EMU*REG(-1)  -0.18 -0.17 -0.11  -0.20 -0.19 -0.13 
  (-7.94)*** (-7.08)*** (-5.51)***  (-9.62)*** (-9.56)*** (-6.79)*** 
COMPET1(-1) -0.11      -0.10     
 (-0.96)      (-0.86)     
COMPET1
2(-1) -0.57      -0.56     
 (-0.55)      (-0.53)     
EMU*COMPET1(-1) -2.76     -2.64    
 (-2.81)***      (-2.78)***     
COMPET2(-1)   0.05    0.05  
   (0.38)    (0.36)  
COMPET2
2(-1)   -0.15    -0.06  
   (-0.11)    (-0.04)  
EMU*COMPET2(-1)   -1.97    -1.96  
   (-2.77)***    (-2.78)***  
N. OF DEVALUATIONS 
FROM 1979-1993     0.02     -0.01 
     (3.46)***      (-1.89)* 
EMU* N. OF 
DEVALUATIONS 
FROM 1979-1993 
   -0.02     -0.01 
     (-1.83)*      (-1.33) 
         
OBSERVATIONS  1680 1572 1764  1717 1609 1802 
Notes: Generalized least squares regressions allowing for heteroschedasticity of the error term 
and including country, sector and time dummies. T-statisitcs in parenthesis. ***, **, * 
coefficients statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. REG indicator of 
regulatory impediments to product market competition, excluding public ownership; ENERGY, 
COMMUNICATIONS, TRANSPORT, RETAIL and PROFESSIONAL sectorial dummy variable that equals 1 for the 
corresponding sector; ESM dummy variable equal to 1 from 1993 onward for the countries that enter 
the EU's Single Market Programme; EMU dummy variable equal to 1 from 1999 onward for the 
countries that enter the EMU. COMPET1 growth rate of the CPI relative to competitors; COMPET2 
growth rate of the export goods deflators relative to competitors; N. OF DEVALUTIONS FROM 1979-
1993: number of devaluations that a country that belonged to the European Monetary System did 







 Table 3: Other determinants of product markets reforms (sectors indicators) 
  3 SECTORS  5 SECTORS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  REG REG REG REG REG REG 
REG(-1)  0.94 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.93 
  (84.13)*** (75.86)*** (73.56)*** (84.06)*** (75.82)*** (73.43)*** 
ESM*ENERGY  -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
  (-0.52) (-0.59) (-0.71) (-0.52) (-0.66) (-0.73) 
ESM*COMMUNICATIONS  -0.05 -0.06 -0.12 -0.05 -0.06 -0.12 
 (-1.36)  (-1.65)*  (-2.70)***  (-1.35)  (-1.66)*  (-2.76)*** 
ESM*TRANSPORT  -0.18 -0.18 -0.20 -0.18 -0.18 -0.20 
  (4.25)*** (-4.02)*** (-4.28)*** (-4.26)*** (-4.07)*** (-4.34)*** 
EMU*ENERGY  0.27 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.07 0.05 
  (2.48)**  (1.73)*  (1.65)* (1.20) (0.51) (0.36) 
EMU*COMMUNICATIONS 0.13  0.09  0.13 0.00  -0.04  -0.06 
 (1.68)*  (1.13)  (1.55)  (0.02)  (-0.30)  (-0.45) 
EMU*TRANSPORT  0.59 0.54 0.54 0.32 0.28 0.05 
 (7.08)***  (6.40)***  (5.95)***  (1.70)*  (0.97)  (0.20) 
EMU*REG(-1)  -0.19 -0.18 -0.17 -0.19 -0.18 -0.17 
  (-7.46)*** (-6.80)*** (-6.56)*** (-7.50)*** (-6.78)*** (-6.25)*** 
COMPET1(-1) -0.06  -0.04  0.03  -0.06  -0.04  0.02 
 (-0.45)  (-0.27)  (0.22)  (-0.47)  (-0.29)  (0.16) 
COMPET1
2(-1)  -0.81 -0.85 -0.50 -0.75 -0.77 -0.44 
  (-0.71) (-0.71) (-0.40) (-0.66) (-0.64) (-0.36) 
EMU*COMPET1(-1)  -2.63 -2.52 (2.49 -2.79 -2.72 -2.37 
 (-2.19)**  (-2.05)**  (1.93)*  (-2.31)**  (-2.20)**  (-1.81)* 
VA(-1) 2.13  -0.64  -0.42  1.80  -1.33  -0.57 
  (2.24)**  (-0.44) (-0.29) (1.86)* (-0.88) (-0.38) 
LABOR EXPENSES (-1)    3.43      3.87   
   (2.03)**    (2.24)**  
TOT. EMPLOYMENT (-1)      4.90      4.45 
     (2.06)**      (1.85)* 
EMU*VALUE ADDED (-1)        5.57  7.03  3.32 
        (1.64) (1.75)* (0.75) 
EMU*LABOR EXPENSES (-
1)         -1.80  
         (-0.27)  
EMU*TOT. EMPLOYMENT(-
1)         6.90 
           (1.08) 
            
OBSERVATIONS  1383 1282 1158 1383 1282 1158 
Notes: Generalized least squares regressions allowing for heteroschedasticity of the error term 
and including country, sector and time dummies. T-statisitcs in parenthesis. ***, **, * 
coefficients statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. REG indicator of 
regulatory impediments to product market competition, excluding public ownership; ENERGY, 
COMMUNICATIONS, TRANSPORT, RETAIL and PROFESSIONAL sectorial dummy variable that equals 1 for the 
corresponding sector; ESM dummy variable equal to 1 from 1993 onward for the countries that enter 
the EU's Single Market Programme; EMU dummy variable equal to 1 from 1999 onward for the 
countries that enter the EMU. COMPET1 growth rate of the CPI relative to competitors; COMPET2 
growth rate of the export goods deflators relative to competitors; N. OF DEVALUTIONS FROM 1979-
1993: number of devaluations that a country that belonged to the European Monetary System did 
from 1979 to 1993 VA value added at the sectorial level; LABOR EXPENSES labor costs or 
compensation of employees at the sectorial level; TOT EMPLOYMENT Total employment at the 





 Table 4: Other determinants of product markets reforms (countries indicators) 
  3 SECTORS  5 SECTORS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  REG REG REG REG REG REG 
REG(-1)  0.92 0.91 0.92 0.89 0.86 0.87 
  (75.89)*** (68.51)*** (68.30)*** (55.21)*** (49.64)*** (48.67)*** 
ESM*ENERGY  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  0.02  0.05  0.03 
  (-0.35) (-0.44) (-0.54)  (0.28)  (0.80)  (0.54) 
ESM*COMMUNICATIONS  -0.05 -0.06 -0.11  0.00  0.02  -0.07 
  (-1.22)  (-1.46)  (-2.44)**  (0.02) (0.43) (1.06) 
ESM*TRANSPORT  -0.18 -0.18 -0.19 -0.15 -0.11 -0.15 
  (-3.97)*** (-3.83)*** (-3.94)***  (-2.55)**  (-1.88)*  (-2.30)** 
EMU*ENERGY  0.23 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.01  -0.03 
  (2.10)**  (1.32) (1.26) (0.85) (0.06)  (-0.24) 
EMU*COMMUNICATIONS  0.12 0.07 0.13 0.03  -0.04  0.02 
  (1.47) (0.87) (1.45) (0.27)  (-0.36)  (0.18) 
EMU*TRANSPORT  0.58 0.52 0.52 0.49 0.43 0.39 
  (6.55)*** (5.96)*** (5.57)*** (4.84)*** (4.31)*** (3.66)*** 
EMU*REG(-1)  -0.17 -0.16 -0.16 -0.14 -0.12 -0.11 
  (-6.63)*** (-5.94)*** (-5.82)*** (-4.64)*** (-3.99)*** (-3.57)*** 
COMPET1(-1)  -0.16 -0.15 -0.12 -0.06  0.01  0.03 
  (-1.21) (-1.05) (-0.83) (-0.35)  (0.06)  (0.15) 
COMPET1
2(-1)  0.13 0.25 0.39 0.37 0.50 0.38 
  (0.11) (0.21) (0.32) (0.27) (0.33) (0.26) 
EMU*COMPET1(-1)  -2.66 -2.50 -2.44 -2.62 -2.66 -2.47 
  (-2.15)**  (-2.00)** (-1.87)* (-2.01)**  (-2.02)** (-1.80)* 
VA(-1)  2.52 -0.58  -0.75 2.43 -1.54  -2.30 
  (2.51)** (-0.39)  (-0.48) (1.98)** (-0.77)  (-1.12) 
LABOR  EXPENSES(-1)   3.89    5.70  
   (2.20)**    (2.20)**  
TOT.  EMPLOYMENT(-1)     6.40    8.29 
     (2.49)**    (2.41)** 
CRISIS(-1)  -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.10 
  (-2.30)** (-2.36)** (-2.27)**  (-2.65)***  (-2.48)**  (-2.78)*** 
PR.  SURPLUS/GDP(-1)  0.65 0.61 0.63 0.66 0.59 0.48 
  (2.05)**  (1.82)* (1.84)* (1.70)*  (1.41)  (1.12) 
RIGHT  GOV.(-1)  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
  (-0.83) (-0.96) (-1.01) (-0.52) (-0.83) (-0.75) 
CENTER  GOV.(-1)  -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12 
  (-1.84)* (-2.07)** (-1.71)*  (-1.86)* (-2.08)**  (-1.97)** 
ELECTION  YEAR(-1)  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
  (-1.52) (-1.75)*  (-1.76)* (-0.98)  (-1.10)  (-1.02) 
REG  TRADING  PART.(-1)  0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 
  (2.07)**  (1.88)* (1.69)* (1.94)*  (2.08)**  (2.08)** 
UNEMPL BENEF.(-1)         -0.33  -0.28  -0.38 
      (-2.19)**  (-1.78)*  (-2.35)** 
EMPLOY PROTECTION(-1)         0.04  0.07  0.02 
      (1.01)  (1.67)*  (0.41) 
        
OBSERVATIONS  1301 1211 1119  984  919  835 
Notes: Generalized least squares regressions allowing for heteroschedasticity of the error term 
and including country, sector and time dummies. T-statisitcs in parenthesis. ***, **, * 
coefficients statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. CRISIS dummy variable 
equal to 1 when the output gap (defined as the difference of actual output to potential) is below 
the 90th percentile of the output gap empirical density; PRIMARY SURPLUS/GDP: Primary deficit as 
a share of GDP; RIGHT GOV dummy variable that equals 1 if the government is led by a right 
oriented party; CENTER GOV dummy variable that equals 1 if the government is led by a center 
oriented party; ELECTION YEAR: dummy variable that equals 1 if (parliamentary or presidential) 
elections were held during that year; REG TRADING PARTNERS average of the value of the indicators 
REG for the trading partners; UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT unemployment benefit replacement rate for low-
income workers in their 1st year of unemployment; EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION summary indicator of the 
stringency for employment protection legislation. See Notes to Table 3 and Appendix B for the 





Table 5: The Euro and unemployment benefits 
        















0.93 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.93 
  (38.57)*** (38.58)*** (38.49)*** (36.90)*** (36.02)*** (35.80)*** 
ESM  0.00 0.00  -0.01  0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (1.43) (1.42)  (-1.44)  (0.77) (0.62) (0.78) 
EMU  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (2.03)** (1.35)  (1.62) (2.00)**  (2.35)**  (2.29)** 
EMU*UNEMPL 
BENEF(-1) 
  -0.01      
    (-0.45)      
COMPET(-1)    -0.01      
     (-0.63)     
COMPET1
2(-1)     -0.04     
     (-0.26)     
EMU*COMPET1(-
1) 
   -0.11     
     (-1.27)     
CRISIS(-1)      0.00  0.00  0.00 
      (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.34) 
PR.SURPLUS/GD
P(-1) 
    0.04  0.03  0.03 
      (1.18)  (0.76)  (0.76) 
RIGHT  GOV(-1)      0.00  0.00  0.00 
      (0.12)  (0.48)  (0.32) 
CENT.  GOV(-1)      -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
      (-0.99)  (-0.91)  (-1.11) 
ELECT.  YR(-1)      0.00  0.00  0.00 
      (0.16)  (0.05)  (0.15) 
EMPLOYMENT 
PROTECT.(-1) 
     0.00  0.00 





     -0.10  -0.10 
       (-2.29)**  (-2.39)** 
PMKT 
REGULAT(-1) 
     0.00  0.00 
       (1.38)  (0.45) 
PMKT 
REGULAT(-2) 
      0.01 
        (1.59) 
        
OBSERVATIONS  378 378 360 366 362 362 
Notes: Generalized least squares regressions allowing for heteroschedasticity of the error term 
and including country, sector and time dummies. T-statisitcs in parenthesis. ***, **, * 
coefficients statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT 
TRADING PARTNERS average of the value of the indicator UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT for the trading 
partners; PMKT REGULAT country average value of the sectorial indicator REG. See Notes to Tables 





 Table 6: The Euro and employment protection 
        













        
EMPLOYMENT 
PROTECT(-1)  
0.93 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92 
  (31.35)*** (31.08)*** (31.51)*** (30.70)*** (30.77)*** (30.68)*** 
ESM  -0.01 -0.01 -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  (-0.97) (-0.95) (-1.07)  (0.28)  (0.24)  (0.24) 
EMU  -0.01 0.04  0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 
  (-0.66) (0.79)  (0.04) (-0.89) (0.23) (-0.26) 
EMU* EMPL. 
PROTECT.(-1) 
  -0.02      
    (-1.13)      
COMPET1(-1)     0.00     
     (0.06)     
COMPET1
2(-1)     0.17     
     (0.34)     
EMU*COMPET1(-
1) 
   0.51     
     (0.94)     
CRISIS(-1)      -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
      (-0.91)  (-0.46)  (-0.46) 
PR.SURPLUS/GD
P(-1) 
    0.00  -0.01  -0.01 
      (0.01)  (-0.07)  (-0.08) 
RIGHT  GOV(-1)      -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
      (-1.45)  (-0.99)  (-1.00) 
CENT.  GOV(-1)      0.00  0.00  0.00 
      (0.16)  (0.11)  (0.12) 
ELECT.  YR(-1)      0.00  0.00  0.00 
      (0.51)  (0.37)  (0.38) 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFIT(-1) 
     -0.13  -0.13 




     0.03  0.03 
       (1.46)  (1.46) 
PMKT 
REGULAT(-1) 
     -0.01  0.00 
       (-0.47)  (0.20) 
PMKT 
REGULAT(-2) 
      0.00 
        (0.07) 
        
OBSERVATIONS  373 373 355 362 362 362 
Notes: Generalized least squares regressions allowing for heteroschedasticity of the error term 
and including country, sector and time dummies. T-statisitcs in parenthesis. ***, **, * 
coefficients statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. EMPL PROTECT TRADING 
PARTNERS average of the value of the indicator EMPLOYMENT PROTECT for the trading partners. See 
Notes to Tables 3, 4and 5 and Appendix B for the exact definition of all the variables included 









Table 7: The Euro and wage moderation 
    
 (1)  (2) 
  NOMINAL WAGE GROWTH  NOMINAL WAGE GROWTH 
NOMINAL WAGE GROWTH LAGGED  0.48  0.47 
 (10.43)***  (10.12)*** 
LAGGED INFLATION  0.22  0.24 
 (3.69)***  (3.91)*** 
ESM -0.01   
 (-2.50)**   
EMU 93-98    -0.01 
   (-2.90)*** 
EMU 99-03  0.00  -0.01 
 (0.89)  (-1.50) 
EU-NO EMU 93-03    -0.01 
   (-1.33) 
OBSERVATIONS 508  508 
Notes: Generalized least squares regressions allowing for heteroschedasticity of the error term 
and including country, sector and time dummies. T-statisitcs in parenthesis. See Notes to Table 1 





 Table A1 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  EMU  EMU EMU EMU EMU EMU EMU EMU EMU 
population1sh  -0.73  -17.90 -14.81 -18.51 -16.39 -18.42 -16.92 -17.88 -17.76 
  (-1.53) (-4.94)*** (-5.24)*** (-4.95)*** (-5.35)*** (-5.42)*** (-5.91)*** (-5.49)*** (-6.14)*** 
area1sh    -0.78 -2.44 -2.99 -3.49  0.64  0.65  0.56  0.67 
    (-0.26) (-0.98) (-1.01) (-1.32)  (1.04)  (1.39)  (0.91)  (1.39) 
Prmse    32.79 52.72 57.59 60.63  -14.67  -16.36  -11.17  -17.32 
    (0.97)  (2.00)** (1.82)* (2.20)** (-0.51)  (-0.67)  (-0.43)  (-0.72) 
Yrmse    306.17 246.15 317.92 273.61 264.35 231.70 238.02 232.03 
    (4.54)*** (4.44)*** (4.45)*** (4.41)*** (4.54)*** (4.98)*** (4.44)*** (5.03)*** 
Border    0.69 0.84 0.85 0.93 0.36 0.34 0.28 0.29 
    (2.28)**  (3.26)*** (2.75)*** (3.31)***  (1.43)  (1.69)*  (1.24)  (1.46) 
Comlang    -1.03 -1.07 -1.26 -1.24 -0.81 -0.68 -0.69 -0.64 
    (-4.14)*** (-4.89)*** (-4.54)*** (-4.95)*** (-4.16)*** (-4.20)*** (-3.78)*** (-3.96)*** 
colony    -0.31 -0.32 -0.40 -0.41 -0.42 -0.50 -0.46 -0.58 
   (-1.27)  (1.49)  (-1.60)  (-1.75)*  (-1.84)*  (-2.52)**  (-2.06)**  (-2.85)*** 
lpastinflwdi1    -12.81  -20.67        
    (-2.25)**  (-4.91)***        
lpastlntrade    2.19      2.46     
    (5.63)***      (7.15)***     
laginfldeveu11           5.05  2.37 
           (0.93)  (0.62) 
laglnrtrade        1.85      2.36 
        (6.02)***      (7.62)*** 
laglntrade       2.24      2.41  
       (5.63)***      (6.91)***  
lpastinfldeveu11         5.49  2.33    
         (1.16)  (0.66)    
lpastlnrtrade     1.65      2.20    
     (6.45)***      (7.27)***    
laginflwdi1       -36.02  -37.25      
       (-4.06)***  (-5.11)***      
            
OBSERVATIONS  924  754 754 729 729 754 754 729 729 





  (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
    REG  REG REG  REG REG  REG  REG  REG 
population1sh   -0.20  -0.27 -0.27  -0.26 -0.20  -0.25  -0.29  -0.27 
    (-1.82)* (-1.82)* (-2.25)** (-1.97)** (-1.66)* (-1.54)  (-1.88)* (-1.66)* 
                 
OBSERVATIONS    1665  1665 1647  1647 1665  1665  1647  1647 
                 
R-squared    0.96  0.96 0.96  0.96 0.96  0.96  0.96  0.96 
Notes: See Appendix A for estimation details and and Appendix B for the exact definition of all the variables included in the 
regressions. 
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1986-91 1992-97 1998-2003 1986-2003
PRODUCT MARKET LABOUR MARKET  